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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Political Sub-
division of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
]. MARVEL HUTCHINSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8795 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. All 
italics are ours. 
FACTS 
The law suit in question is one where the County is seeking 
a mandatory injunction against the defendant, ordering said 
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defendant to tear down approximately eight feet of the back 
end of a building. This building was constructed pursuant to 
an enlargement of an existing building allowed by the County 
Board of Adjustment to a point ten feet from the east property 
line of the land on which said building is located ( R. 1 to 5). 
The la\vsuit arose from an application submitted to the Board 
of Adjustment by the defendant through his attorney, LaMar 
Duncan, on April 21, 1955 (Exhibit 1-D). In said application, 
defendant requested a permit for a 48' x 38' enlargement of 
a non-conforming grocery store in a residential R-2 zone, located 
at 3065 South 1700 East, Salt Lake County, Utah. The grocery 
store in question faces west toward 1700 East Street, with its 
entranceway being on the southwest corner of said building, 
the north line of the building being on defendant's property 
line and the south line of said building being approximately 
86 feet north from 3080 South Street. There is a parking area 
between 3080 South Street and the existing building. The 
enlargement sought by defendant would extend the existing 
building easterly to approximately 28 inches from the east 
property line (Exhibits 1-D, 5-D and 10, R-27 to 29). Sub-
sequently, a hearing on defendant's application \Yas held be-
fore the County Board of Adjustment on ~fay 19, 1955. As a 
result of the hearing, the Board of Adjustment granted the 
request but provided specifically that a distance of 10 feet be 
maintained from the east property line (Exhibit 2-D). A letter 
\vas sent from the County Board of Adjustment to Mr. Joseph 
F. Horne, the Chief Building Inspector, dated May 23, 1955, 
with one copy to 11r. LaMar Duncan, the attorney for de-
fendant, and another copy to the District PL1nning Commission 
(Exhibit 3-D). Subsequent to this, a letter dated May 27, 
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1955, fron1 J. F. Horne to Mr. LaMar Duncan was mailed. 
Both of these letters contained a statement of the action by the 
Board of Adjustment providing that a distance of ten feet 
be maintained from the east property line. Mr. Duncan testified 
that he was out of town for approximately a week or ten days 
in the latter part of May, including Memorial Day, and that 
just before he left town he called the County Surveyor's Office 
and was informed that the application had been approved. 
He then called defendant and told him to go ahead with his 
building. Then when he returned to Salt Lake City, he found 
the letter, dated May 23rd, (Exhibit 3-D) and learned at that 
time of the restriction that the building must not be closer than 
ten ( 10) feet from the east property line. He further testified 
that at that time he telephoned defendant and told hin1 of the 
ten (10) foot restriction (R. 97 to 98). The defendant, J. 
11arvel Hutchinson, testified that upon receipt of word fron1 
his attorney to go ahead, he had the work started in the 
latter part of May or the first part of June (R-32); that this 
was before he had obtained his building permit in July (R-33). 
The defendant admits that the excavation was all that was 
done in regard to the work on the new structute at the time 
he learned of the true decision of the Board of Adjustnzent 
with the ten ( 10) foot restriction and that this exca-
vation work had only taken two day/ work by the contractor 
(R-38). 
It is interesting to note that there is a plot plan on 
the back of the application for the building permit vvhich 
provides the information to the building inspector as to the 
dimensions and location of the building on the lot in question. 
The building permit was issued on July 5, 1955. The plot plan 
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on the back of the application shows dimensions of 3 7' x 40' 
(Exhibit 5-D). However, Mr. Hutchinson denies that he placed 
the figures of 10 feet on said plat plan. It is interesting to 
note that the 3 7' x 40' dimensions are exactly what \vas granted 
to Mr. I-Iutchinson by the Board of Adjustment although he 
originally claimed that the application for the building permit 
had been presented by him in 1951 or 1952 (R-35). Sub-
sequently, Marjorie L. Griffith from the Salt Lake County 
Surveyor's Office, testified that the form used for the application 
for the building permit in question was not in use until the 
year 1954 (R-68). Subsequently, Mr. Hutchinson came back 
to the witness stand and testified that he could have made the 
application in the fall of 1954 or the early spring of 195 5 
before the date of the application to the Board of Adjustment 
of April 21, 1955 (R-110). 
Mr. Hutchinson went on to testify that work on his 
new addition remained idle at the axcavation stage for 
about a month almost into August. At that time, he started 
construction again, constructing the building to within 28 
inches of his east property line as he had originally started 
to do. He stated that he had received the impression from his 
attorney that it \vas all right to go ahead (R-40) . The counsel 
for Mr. Hutchinson, LaMar Duncan, denied that he told Mr. 
Hutchinson to go ahead with his building but stated he inforn1ed 
him that he felt it could be ironed out (R-105). Mr. Duncan 
stated that he talked \vith Comn1issioner Gunderson~ the 
Chairn1an of the Board of Adjusttnent, 11r. 1fulcock, and the 
County Surveyor in regard to the hardship of his clienf s c~1se 
and that the door had never been completely closed on his being 
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able to obtain approval for the building to be built 28 inches 
from the east property line. 
Mr. Joseph F. Horne, the chief building inspector of Salt 
Lake County, stated that on October 9, 1955, while out driving 
on a Sunday afternoon, he observed Mr. Hutchinson's building, 
which appeared to be two or three feet from the east property 
line. He then sent one of his inspectors, Mr. George Daly, out 
to inspect 1vfr. Hutchinson's building on the 11th or 12th of 
October (R-79). Mr. Daly testified that on Wednesday, 
October 12, 195 5, he made an inspection of the Hutchinson 
premises. He states that the building was up to the point where 
it was ready to have the roof put on and that it was within 
approximately three feet of the east property line. l--ie states 
that at that time he informed Mr. Hutchinson that he was 
in violation and that he was even in violation of his own build-
ing permit. Mr. Hutchinson informed Mr. Daly that his attorney 
told him that it was OK. Mr. Daly then reported the occur-
rence to Mr. Horne (R-73-74). Mr. Horne, upon receiving 
the report from Mr. Daly called Mr. Hutchinson on the tele-
phone and asked him in effect why he had built in violation, 
and Mr. Hutchinson informed him that Mr. Duncan had told 
him to go ahead, that the County wouldn't do anything any-
way (R-80). 
It may be pointed out that by stipulation, pars. 4 and 5 
of plaintiff's complaint were admitted by the defendant (R-24). 
These paragraphs have to do with the facts that defendant's 
property is in a residential R-2 zone, that the grocery business 
\vhich he operates on said property is a non-conforming use 
and that an addition or enlargement of the non-conforming 
use may be granted by the Board of Adjustment. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
AGAINST THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ESTOPPEL OR 
HARDSHIP TO PREVENT THE COUNTY FROM EN-
FORCING ITS ZONING ORDINANCES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
AGAINST THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court sums up its memorandum decision in this 
case as follows (R-133): 
qit is apparent and clear that the error is not any 
wilful violation on the part of the defendant Hutchin-
son, but one that would not have occurred at all had 
Inspector Horne done his duty at the time he should 
have done it instead of a month or so later \Vhen the 
building was up. And now the inspector seeks to com-
pel the defendant to tear do,vn the ne\Y structure or a 
part thereof, which \Vould just \Yreck the building and 
its business, and serve no useful purpose. Reason and 
equity revolts against such action on a record and a 
situation such as this. To make a man who earnestlv 
tried to itnprove his store to insure a livelihood foJr 
his family without detrin1ent to anyone and, believing 
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he was in full compliance with the law and was so 
advised, must suffer wreck and ruin because a County 
Inspector was long dilatory in doing his service, which 
had he done promptly as he should have done, the 
regulation would not have been innocently violated and 
the problem would not have arisen. 
((The in junction and order sought by Plaintiff are 
denied and the cause of action dismissed.'' 
T?e court had the following observations in its memo-
randum decision as to the duties of the building inspector 
(R-132): 
((By the provisions of the County zoning ordinance 
and also the testimony of Inspector Horne, his duty 
is not to pass judgment on the material used nor upon 
the workmanship of the contractor but merely to see 
that the applicant lays his excavation or wall lines the 
proper distance from the boundary lines of the prop-
erty. This, of course, imposes upon him the duty of 
making immediate contact with the applicant at the 
place of building to see that the lines are properly put 
or marked upon the land. There his job is through. 
Instead of meeting this duty, he did nothing at all until 
one day when he was driving by defendant's place, on 
strictly personal business, he saw the structure ready 
all but some roofing. So, he stopped and told applicant 
to tear it down. At the trial it was freely said that the 
error was not itself serious, but the building as erected 
was taken as an affront or ornery attitude toward an 
official, not the Board of Adjustment. The abutting 
property owners testified that the building in its present 
structure was not a detriment to their property and so 
testified that they preferred it as is, as against the 
authorized plan.'' 
There is no support in the record for the finding made 
by the trial court that the violation of the zoning ordinance 
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by the defendant Hutchinson was an innocent violation. There 
is no support in the law for the trial court imposing the duty 
on a building inspector to immediately find violations of the 
zoning ordinances, and if he does not find said violations, 
holding that the county in effect has waived its right to enforce 
the zoning ordinances. Furthermore, the foregoing language 
is a clear indication that the trial court considered matters 
entirely outside of its province, such as the alleged assertion 
that the building as erected was taken as an affront or ornery 
attitude toward an official, not the Board of Adjustment. Fur-
thermore, the trial court took upon itself the function of 
finding that the structure, as it was, was not a detriment to the 
abutting property owners and relying on the fact that they 
preferred the building as it is rather than as it should be under 
the zoning ordinances. Certainly it cannot be disputed that the 
determination of what is proper zoning and what is not, is 
exclusively for the legislative branch of the county government 
and not for the court. 
In regard to the trial court's finding of an innocent vio-
lation, the evidence, as herefore stated, shows that the defend-
ant, by his own testimony, knew that his building plans were 
in violation of the order by the Board of Adjustment at a 
time when the only work that had been done on the property 
was one or two days of excavation work. Furthermore~ this 
excavation work was admittedly done before defendant had 
even obtained his building pern1it. Certainly this testimony is 
conclusive of the fact that the violation by defendant \vas 
not an innocent violation. He kne\Y of the restriction placed 
on his building by the Board of Adjusttnent before any sub-
10 
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stantial work had been done, and any misunderstandings 
he may have had were clearly misunderstandings between 
he and his lawyer. It cannot be contended that the county 
should be responsible for any misunderstandings that defend-
ant's own lawyer may have created in the mind of defendant. 
It will be remembered that the testimony of defendant was 
to the effect that his lawyer advised him to continue on with 
the work of his building, and the lawyer testified that he had 
not so advised the defendant but had merely told him that 
he was confident of getting the county officials to relent 1n 
their attitude of strictly enforcing the zoning ordinance. 
There is no justification whatsoever for the court holding 
as it did that the county cannot enforce its zoning ordinances 
if the building inspector does not find violations early. The 
most recent pronouncement by this court on this subject is 
the case of H. C. Hargraves, Building Inspector for Salt Lake 
City vs. Harry L. Young, Kenneth L. Anderson and William 
W a/kenhorst, 1955, 280 P2 974, 3 U2d. 175. This case in-
volved carports as shown in the picture in the report ( ap-
parently an aluminum roof held up by steel poles) and whether 
or not these carports violated the Salt Lake City Ordinances as 
to side yards when the structures intruded into the side yards 
required by the city ordinances. The lower court held that the 
city ordinance was inapplicable to these carports and that there 
\Vas no reasonable relationship between prohibiting such a 
structure in side yards and the public health, safety, morals 
or general welfare. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the 
trial court and held that the ordinance does apply and that 
there is a reasonable relationship. The following language at 
page 975 appears to be applicable to the case at bar: 
11 
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((Authorities generally accepting such a conclusion 
are in harmony with Gorieb vs. Fox, 274 u·.s. 603, 
47 S. Ct. 675, 71 L Ed 1228, and we are impelled to 
follow them even though defendants will suffer in a 
situation where they acted in apparent good faith not 
realizing the import of the ordinances existing at the 
time they erected these structures." 
The foregoing language shows that the good faith of 
the defendant in violating zoning ordinances and the fact that 
he will suffer a hardship cannot relieve him of the conse-
quences of violating the zoning ordinances. Furthermore, the 
court in the foregoing case held that as to the side yard ordi-
nances, there was a reasonable relationship between prohibiting 
such structures and the public health, safety, morals or gen-
eral welfare. This holding would prohibit the trial court from 
considering such matters as the fact that the structure in the 
case at bar was not a detriment to the property of the neighbors 
and that the neighbors preferred it as it is as against the author-
ized plan. 
POINT II. 
TI-IERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ESTOPPEL OR 
HARDSHIP TO PREVENT THE COUNTY FROM EN-
FORCING ITS ZONING ORDINANCES. 
Apparently the trial court has based its decision on grounds 
of estoppel and hardship. The existing case la\Y on this subject 
clearly would not allo\v such a defense in the case at bar. In 
the case of Provo City, et al vs. Claudin et al, Utah, 1936, 63 
Pac. 2d 5 70 91 U 60, the city brought suit to enjoin the 
operation of a funeral home in a residential class B zone. 
12 
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Among other defenses, the defendants alleged estoppel. This 
alleged estoppel was based on the reason of a permit 
to remodel and the remodeling of the building under the 
supervision of a building inspector, involving, without protest 
or complaint by the city or its officials, the expenditure of 
large sums of money. In answer to this contention the court 
stated at page 574: 
((Assuming that the employees of the city granted 
the permit and supervised the building, it vv-as all know-
ingly without authority or right by defendants, granting 
that the Board of Adjustment was acting within its 
jurisdiction and its decision had not been overturned. 
An estoppel cannot be erected on such a foundation." 
The following cases from other jurisdictions fortify and 
substantiate the holding of this court in the Claudin case. 
McCavic vs. DeLuca, Minn., 46 NW 2nd 873: This was 
a law suit between private individuals where the plaintiff's 
residences were located on lots adjoining the lot on which 
defendant erected a concrete block store building, and the 
building was so built that it extended seven feet out in front 
of the residences and violated the setback line established by 
the city ordinances. The court held that defendant's violation 
of the ordinance was not so trivial as to bar the plaintiffs fron1 
injunctive relief impelling the defendant to comply -vvith the 
ordinance by removing the portion of the building which pro-
truded beyond the setback line. 
Everett vs. Capitol lVfotor Transport Conzpany, Mass.} 
114 NE 2nd 547: This case held that the doctrine of laches 
has no application as to the enforcement by a municipality 
of its ordinances. 
13 
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Corning vs. Town of Ontario, N. Y., 121 NY S 2nd 288: 
This case held that the fact that town officers represented to 
a property owner that he might use a house trailer as a place 
to live and that such representations were relied upon, did 
not estop the town from enforcing a zoning ordinance or 
justify the granting of a temporary injunction restraining such 
attempted enforcement. 
Raleigh vs. Fisher, N.C. 61 SE 2d 897: This case involved 
a suit by the city to enjoin a defendant from conducting a 
bakery in a residential district. It was alleged that officers of 
the city had knowingly encouraged or permitted the violation 
for 10 years and that the defendant would suffer great hard-
ship if the injunction were granted. The court stated at page 
902: 
( (In the very nature of things, the police power of 
the state cannot be bartered away by contract, or lost 
by any other mode. This being true, a municipality 
cannot be estopped to enforce a zoning ordinance 
against a violation by the conduct of its officials in 
encouraging or permitting such a violator to violate 
such ordinance in times past. (Citing cases.)" 
Newton vs. Tou·n of Highland Pa,-k et al._. Texas, 1955, 282 
SW 2d 266. The property involved in this la\v suit was located in 
a single farnil y dwelling district zoned A -area and consisted of 
a lot 71 feet x 225Vz feet with improvements thereon. When the 
town of Highland Park was zoned in 1929 the itnprovements 
consisted of a two-story brick veneer house \vith accessory 
buildings, such as a garage. Later a S\\'imn1ing pool \\·as con-
~tructed in the rear yard. All of the in1provements confonned 
\v ith the provisions of the t0\\'11, s ordinances. Subsequent to 
1--1 
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that time, however, numerous additions were made. In 1941, 
for instance, application was made for a permit to build a 
pergola in the rear yard at a cost of $250.00. When this so-
called pergola was finished it turned out to be a structure 
built to resemble a ship and had cost $60,000.00. The owners 
started to use this ship as a commercial center for parties. They 
also built fences in the rear to a height of 16 to 20 feet. There 
were numerous fences in the front and side yards. The additions 
to the structures violated the building code in numerous sec-
tions of the ordinance. Over a period of time the town at-
tempted to get removal of the structures that violated the 
several ordinances. Although agreements were made, they 
were never kept. Finally the suit was started by the town of 
Highland Park which sought a permanent injunction ordering 
the removal of certain of the structures. It was contended 
among other things, by the owners, that the town of Highland 
Park was estopped by laches, limitations and lack of diligence 
from enforcing the ordinance to certain of the structures in 
controversy. The court states at page 275: 
"The general rule is that cities in the discharge of 
their governmental as distinguished from their pro-
prietary functions cannot be bound or estopped by un-
authorized acts of the officers." (Citing cases.) 
* * * 
"It is true that there are exceptions to the rule. The 
rule as to the exceptions has been stated by our Su-
preme Court in City of San Angelo vs. Deutsch, 126 
Tex. 532, 91 SW 2d 308, 311; 'The opinion is ex-
pressed in a number of decisions that a city may be 
estopped even when it is acting in its public capacity 
15 
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if it has received or accepted benefits from the trans-
action.' " 
The court went on to hold that there had been no such 
benefits received by the city in the case in question. 
Also see Sharrow vs. City of Dania, Florida, 1955, 83 
So. 2d 274, and Town of Eastchester vs. Noble, N. Y., 1956, 
148 NY S. 2nd 592. 
It will be noted from the foregoing cases that involve 
situations where public officials have actively encouraged the 
violations in question, the courts uniformly hold that a city 
or county can not be estopped by wrongful and unauthorized 
action by a public official. In the case at bar, the most that is 
claimed by the defendant is lack of action on the part of the 
public official in question. The claim is made that because of 
the failure of the building inspector to stop the defendant from 
violating the zoning ordinance at an early stage, the county 
should now be estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The 
reasons for denying such a defense in the case at bar are far 
more persuasive than they were in the foregoing cases in 
which such a defense was held invalid. 
It is stated in McQuillin. Municipal Co,-porationJ. 3r.d ed. 
vol. 8, page 857: 
( (Furthermore, it is no defense to the suit that the 
defendant will suffer hardship fron1 enforcement of 
the ordinance in the particular involved, at least where 
the hardship is consequent only on the defendant's 
violation of the zoning ordinance." 
16 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit that the trial court ignored the evidence that 
the defendant knew of the restriction when he constructed the 
major portion of the building in question. Furthermore, the 
trial court considered improper matters such as the propriety 
of the restriction in question and the personal relations between 
the parties involved. The trial court's decision is against exist~ 
ing law in that it is based on a principle of equitable estoppel 
and hardship which is not applicable in the case at bar accord· 
ing to the clear line of authorities on the subject. We urge that 
the trial court's decision should be reversed and the County 
granted its mandatory injunction as it is entitled under the 
provisions of Sec. 17-27-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The 
upholding of the trial court's decision will emasculate the 
pov1er of the County to enforce its zoning ordinances. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK E. MOSS 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Deputy, Civil Division 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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